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Abstract:  * 
Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompeti-
tive.  We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect net-
work effects and thus are susceptible to applications barriers to entry.  Exclusive con-
tracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can 
heighten entry barriers.  We test these theories in the home video game market.  We find 
that indirect network effects from software on hardware demand are present, and that ex-
clusivity takes market share from rivals, but only when most games are non-exclusive.  
The marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand.  Thus, al-
lowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to domination by 
one system protected by a hedge of complementary software.  Our investigation suggests 
that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution 
of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting.     
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1. Introduction  
Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships feature prominently in antitrust cases 
in network industries.  At issue are contracts a firm with market power signs with its sup-
pliers or buyers that may limit access to the market by its rivals.  We focus on the case in 
which the firm signs exclusive contracts with upstream suppliers.  For example, in the 
1980’s developers of games for Nintendo’s video game console agreed not to provide any 
titles for other platforms (Atari v. Nintendo).1  In U.S. v. Microsoft, the dominant soft-
ware provider was charged with abusing its monopoly power in its contracts with Internet
content providers and independent software developers, with the goal of excluding com-
petitors to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser.
 
 
ny.   
                                                
2  Exclusive contracts such as these are
an example of vertical restraints, an area in law and economics that has generated as 
much controversy as a
We examine the impacts of exclusionary contracts between hardware manufactur-
ers and software providers in the home video game market.  An important feature of the 
market for video game consoles is indirect network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), 
whereby the consumer valuation of the primary product (the console, or “platform”) in-
creases with the number of complementary goods available (gaming software).  If plat-
form providers enjoy indirect network effects, then each may want to prevent suppliers of 
its complementary good from also supplying competing platforms (Evans, 2003; Ré-
gibeau, 2004).  When a dominant platform provider and the producers of the complemen-
tary goods sign such exclusionary contracts, they burden competing platforms and poten-
tial challengers with producing the complementary goods themselves or finding alterna-
tive suppliers, which may raise rivals’ costs and can diminish competition (Brennan, 
 
1 975 F.2d 832 (1992). 
2 253 F.3d 34 (2001).  Other charges regarding exclusive contracts in the case include the allegation that 
Microsoft projected its market power downstream in its contracts with computer manufacturers to exclude 
competing browsers from the desktops of new computers.  
1 
2007).  This is the “applications barrier to entry” at issue in the Microsoft case.  Foreclo-
sure of competitors can result (Armstrong and Wright, 2007).  Whether survival of a sin-
gle dominant platform is inefficient or to the detriment of consumers depends on the size 
of duplicated costs among platforms, the heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences among 
platforms and among the complementary goods, and other factors.   
We focus on estimating, determining the causes of, and exploring the implications 
of indirect network effects for exclusively and non-exclusively provided games.  Exclu-
sive titles are those games that can only be played on one system, because the console 
producer either created the game itself or negotiated an exclusive contract with a video 
game maker.  We examine the sixth-generation videogame console market, which com-
prises Nintendo’s GameCube, Sony’s PlayStation2, and Microsoft’s Xbox, and uncover 
an interesting finding: although we find strong indirect network effects, and a large im-
pact of exclusivity on rivals’ console demand when most games are non-exclusive, the 
marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand.  Exclusivity 
helps a firm establish market share at first, but beyond a certain point additional locking 
up of software supply no longer hurts rivals.  Consequently,  there is no ability to capture 
ever more console consumers through locking in an increasing supply of exclusive games.  
Such capture of the whole market is often assumed in discussion or derived in theoretical 
models of the video game industry in specific or platform markets in general.   
By itself, a finding that exclusivity does not affect console demand on the margin 
does not necessarily imply that there is no consumer harm, for with heterogeneous game 
quality it may be that a console maker need only lock in the best games to harm the ri-
vals’ ability to compete.  However, our investigation suggests that exclusionary contracts 
did not hurt consumers, due to two important features of the videogame market.  The 
bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers, coupled with the existence of 
“blockbuster” games that enable competitors to establish market share, prevents the fore-
2 
closure of rivals through exclusive contracting suggested by some models (Armstrong 
and Wright, 2007).  As a result, if exclusive contracts in industries sharing these charac-
teristics allow firms to enter and establish market share but not to dominate the market, 
then antitrust intervention (as requested, but not granted, in Atari v. Nintendo), may not 
be warranted. 
We develop our exposition by first laying out the economic and legal issues per-
taining to exclusive vertical contracts in the next section.  We describe the home video 
game market in section 3 and present our econometric model and data in sections 4 and 5, 
respectively.  Our econometric results are in section 6, and we address whether there is an 
applications barrier to entry in the market in section 7.  In section 8, we take a closer look 
at the nature of software provision, which suggests why the harm that exclusive vertical 
contracts can do to competition is likely to be limited in the video game market.  We con-
clude and discuss open questions raised by our work in the final section. 
2. The Law and Economics of Exclusive Vertical Contracts 
Exclusive contracts in vertical markets can be attacked with the antitrust laws in 
the Sherman Act, if they restrain trade, and the Clayton Act, if they lessen competition.3 
An exclusionary contract between a game console manufacturer and a software provider 
may be illegal if it harms competition among hardware manufacturers.  Harm to competi-
tion exists if contracts that lock up popular games prevent the entry (or hasten the exit) of 
rival consoles that would have been valued by consumers into the hardware market.  As a 
practical matter, discouraged potential entrants may not be observed.  Therefore, it is im-
portant to examine the impact of exclusive contracts on existing competitors, the ap-
proach we take.  If we show (as we do below) that exclusive contracting between the 
                                                 
3 See the working paper for a more complete discussion of the law regarding vertical restraints. 
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dominant platform and its suppliers has little effect beyond a certain point on existing 
firms, then it is unlikely that the contracts raise significant entry barriers.  
The economic literature considering vertical restraints in markets with indirect 
network effects is still small.4   As in the traditional literature on vertical restraints (e.g., 
Segal and Whinston, 2000), the welfare impacts of vertical restraints in network markets 
are ambiguous.  Church and Gandal (2000) show that foreclosure following a merger in a 
market with indirect network effects may raise or lower consumer surplus.5   
Vertical restraints through exclusive contracts in markets with indirect network 
effects, the most germane literature for our study, are explored in Armstrong and Wright 
(2007) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003).  Equilibrium in these models is sensitive to the 
choice of parameters and the structure of the model, and we mention a few results only.  
The former show that when consumers prefer using one platform over another, partial 
foreclosure equilibria may result from exclusive contracts.  The winning platform locks 
in all software supply, its buyers pay higher prices, and the losing platform survives only 
by creating its own software.  Armstrong and Wright (2007) also show that without in-
trinsic differentiation among platforms,6 exclusive contracts lead to a single platform sur-
viving (complete foreclosure), which, though efficient, leaves buyers with no surplus.  In 
the related model of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), an incumbent platform with high 
enough quality will choose exclusivity to deter entry. 
                                                 
4 However, the economic analysis of exclusive agreements with suppliers in markets with indirect network 
effects, as Régibeau (2004) notes, is similar in many respects to traditional analysis of exclusive outlets, 
exclusive dealing, and foreclosure. See the working paper (Prieger and Hu, 2007) for discussion and cita-
tions to the literature.   
5 Foreclosure may increase consumer surplus in the model of Church and Gandal (2000) when the transport 
cost in consumers’ preferences along the Hotelling line differentiating the platforms is relatively high and 
the foreclosing firm captures the entire platform market.  When transport costs are high, to entice all con-
sumers away from the rival platform requires that the foreclosing firm set a low platform price, which 
benefits consumers.  
6 That is, there is neither an intrinsic benefit from subscription to a platform (apart from consumption of the 
complementary good) nor a transport cost in consumers’ preferences along the Hotelling line for platforms. 
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In both Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong and Wright (2007), the soft-
ware suppliers have no market power.7  However, we find evidence of considerable bar-
gaining power on the part of game publishers.  We show in section 7 that the top publish-
ers have large market share and games of above-average quality, and are much more 
likely than smaller publishers are to make their games available for multiple platforms.  
When large suppliers have enough negotiating power to resist demands for exclusivity 
from console makers, the anticompetitive impact from the exclusive contracts (mostly 
signed by smaller suppliers) may be minimal on the margin.  We indeed find that the 
marginal exclusive game title has virtually no impact on console demand. 
3. The Market for Sixth Generation Home Video Games 
A video game system is a hardware platform that allows demanders (the video 
game consumers) to trade with suppliers (the video game publishers).  Different brands of 
hardware are not compatible with each other—gamers cannot play software designed for 
one console on another.8  Because of the mutual incompatibility among consoles, buying 
a console is akin to choosing a platform to trade with software providers—a “two-sided 
market,” as it is often called in the literature.   
The home video game market is a promising setting to look for applications barri-
ers to entry.  Exclusive contracts play an important role in the market and the market is 
large.  Sales of consoles, portable devices, and software in the video game industry total 
about $10 billion, greater than that of Hollywood’s box office.9  We focus on sixth gen-
                                                 
7 Hogendorn and Yuen (2007) allow a complementary good supplier to have market power, but design their 
model to preclude the possibility of foreclosure. 
8 The exception is the backward compatibility of different generations of hardware produced by the same 
manufacturer. For example, the software for PlayStation (5th generation) can be played in PlayStation 2.  
9 Entertainment Software Association, “Essential facts about the computer and video game industry,” May, 
18, 2005. 
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eration video game consoles, which include Sony’s PlayStation2, Microsoft’s Xbox, and 
Nintendo’s GameCube.10 
PlayStation2 entered the US market in October 2000, and Xbox and GameCube 
appeared one year later.  Table 1 shows characteristics of the consoles.  Microsoft intro-
duced the console with the best hardware quality, evaluated in terms of processing speed 
and memory (RAM).  Table 1 shows that Microsoft priced Xbox similarly to Play-
Station2, while Nintendo set GameCube’s price well below the other two.  The sixth gen-
eration began to be superseded near the end of 2005 when Microsoft introduced the Xbox 
360.  Our data covers March 2002 to December 2004. 
PlayStation2 enjoys the largest amount of available software (Table 2).  During 
our data period, PlayStation2 started with the most software and provided almost half of 
the new software available in the market.  PlayStation2’s leading position in software 
availability strengthened hardware sales, due to the complementary nature of hardware 
and software, and helps to explain why PlayStation2 was the best-selling console in the 
market given its higher price and poorer hardware quality.  The monthly figures for sales 
(Figure 1) show that PlayStation2 had the highest console sales until Xbox overtakes its 
market-leading position in 2004. 
There are different sources of revenue for console producers: revenue from sales 
of consoles and games produced in-house, and license fees and royalties charged to inde-
pendent game publishers.  However, as in most two-sided markets, profits are extracted 
from one side only (Rochet and Tirole, 2003): console makers hope to earn their profit 
from the sales of gaming software.  In fact, there is evidence that Microsoft and Sony set 
console prices below marginal cost.11     
                                                 
10 The sixth generation also includes its pioneering member, Sega’s Dreamcast console.  Sega dropped out 
of the market in 2000 (before the period for which we have data) and was never a major player, and we do 
not include Dreamcast in the analysis.   
11 D. Becket and J. Wilcox (“Will Xbox Drain Microsoft?” CNET News.com, March 6, 2001) estimate that 
Xbox initially cost Microsoft $375 per unit.  This is the marginal cost of the hardware only, not including 
6 
The business model of the gaming industry—hardware as a loss leader for soft-
ware—explains why console makers charge game developers no access fees and even 
subsidize creation of games by providing development tools for their platform  (Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003).  Table 2 shows that independent software publishers produce the most 
software for each console (91% of the total), with a far smaller amount created by the 
console manufacturers.  A software publisher may produce its games in-house or contract 
out to independent developers.  Games sold by independent publishers profit the console 
maker through royalty agreements.  The average cost of developing a 128-bit game is 
about $6 million.12  
A game publisher will consider a console’s current and expected installed base 
when deciding for which platforms to write a game.  Negotiations over license fees and 
royalties hinge in part on whether the game is exclusive to the console.  In Table 2, we 
also show the proportion of software that is provided exclusively, which is one measure 
of product differentiation among systems. PlayStation2 has the greatest proportion of ex-
clusive software, showing its bargaining strength with software publishers and developers. 
Software publishers undertake their own marketing as well through advertising and trade 
show participation.  Costs are certain but rewards are not:  only a small portion of games 
is profitable.13  The distribution of returns is highly skewed: a mega-hit such as Grand 
Theft Auto – San Andreas has a return more than 40 times the average development cost. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sales, marketing, or development costs.  The price at launch for Xbox was $299.  The article also cites a 
claim that Microsoft’s per-unit loss on Xbox is comparable to Sony’s loss on PlayStation2. 
12 Southwest Securities, Interactive Entertainment Software: Industry Report, Fall, 2000.  The figure in-
cludes licensing fees paid to content providers.  For example, publishers of NBA basketball games pay li-
cense fees to the league. 
13 The fraction of software that earns positive profit has been estimated to be in the five to ten percent range 
(Coughlan, 2004; DFC Intelligence, The Business of Computer and Video Games, March 2004, summa-
rized at http://www.dfcint.com/game_article/feb04article.html).   
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4. Modeling Console Demand 
To address whether vertical exclusive contracts in the industry lead to applica-
tions barriers to entry, we model the hardware adoption side of the platform market for 
video games.  The techniques we use are now well established in the empirical literature 
on indirect network effects (Chou and Shy, 1990; Church and Gandal, 1992, 1993; Nair, 
et al., 2004), and we therefore present them here in abbreviated form.  Clements and 
Ohashi (2005) also apply these techniques to the video game industry.  Our empirical 
models are taken from and described more fully in Prieger and Hu (2006), where we de-
rive and estimate a complete model of consumer utility for hardware and software and 
competitive, free entry supply of software.14  Here we focus on the empirical part of the 
model for console demand, which is similar to that of Clements and Ohashi (2005).   
The decision tree for the consumers’ choice of console has two levels.  In the first 
stage, consumers decide whether to buy a console or to make no purchase.  If a household 
decides to buy, it next chooses among the J = 3 alternative brands.  The decision tree, 
along with suitable assumptions for the random elements of consumers’ utility, leads to a 
nested logit estimating equation: 
 ln(sjt) – ln(s0t) = cj + dt + ppjt  + ln(Njt) +  ln(sjt|g) + jt (1) 
where sjt is market share, is the market share of the outside alternative (no purchase), 
and t indexes the months in our data.
0ts
15 
On the right side of equation (1), cj is a dummy variable for brand j, subsuming 
the impact on demand of the hardware attributes of a system, which do not change within 
the generation.  Term dt represents a set of holiday and year indicator variables.  We al-
                                                 
14 Our model for console demand differs in specification from that in Prieger and Hu (2006).  We also use a 
different source for our software data. 
15   When calculating market shares, we assume that each household buys one console only.  This model 
leads to an intuitive substitution pattern: when a household substitutes away from a console it is more likely 
to buy another console than to buy none.  As described in Prieger and Hu (2006), equation (1) is derived 
from a model of utility maximizing consumers with preferences for hardware and software. 
8 
low console demand to differ during peak game purchasing times:  June for the start of 
summer vacation, and November/December for the year-end holiday season.  The hard-
ware price is pjt.  Njt is the number of software titles available, so that the important pa-
rameter  measures the strength of the indirect network effect.  We remove the skewness 
of the software distribution and reduce the influence of outliers by choosing Njt to enter (1) 
in log form.  In one specification, we also measure available software with a revenue-
weighted average. 
The term sjt|g is the within-group market share of console j (defined as sjt /(1 – s0t)); 
its coefficient   is the nested logit inclusive value parameter, and represents the correla-
tion between consumer choices within the nest, and thus is bounded between zero and 
one.  Higher values of   imply that the cross-elasticities are higher among consoles than 
between a console and the outside good (no purchase).  Thus, higher values of  reflect 
that when the price of one gaming console rises, there is a greater likelihood that a con-
sumer substitutes toward purchasing another system rather than buying none at all.  The 
error term jt captures the deviation of average hardware quality of console j known to the 
consumers but not the econometrician, and we assume that (conditional on exogenous 
observables) it has zero mean.  The variable jt incorporates all variables pertaining to 
consumer perceptions about the hardware brand not elsewhere included in the data, such 
as advertising and the “word on the street”.  Because we include console effects, jt repre-
sents deviations over time (net of the average tastes for console j) in consumer tastes for 
the console brand.  Allowing jt to vary over time reflects the non-constant nature of ad-
vertising and evolving consumer perceptions of the brand. 
We estimate the model via an efficient version of linear instrumental variables, a 
procedure suggested by Berry (1994) that is commonly used in demand estimation of dis-
crete choice models using aggregate data.  We use a GMM procedure that is efficient in 
9 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.16  It is important to note that we 
do not estimate a fully dynamic structural model here.17  In particular, hardware demand 
is based only on the current stock of software available, without explicitly accounting for 
expected future software variety.  These expectations no doubt contribute to the console-
specific and console-year fixed effects in the demand estimation. 
5. Data and Endogeneity Issues 
The data we analyze is for the sixth-generation home video game market.  The 
potential market size for hardware is the total number of households with at least one 
television.18  Monthly console sales data from NPD Fun Group, along with the calculated 
market size, allows us to create all market share variables from March 2002 to December 
2004, giving us 34 months of data per console.19  The start of the sample period accords 
with Xbox’s entrance into the Japanese market, necessary since we use Japanese market 
data as instruments.  The end of the period is chosen to minimize the possible impact on 
demand due to the anticipated introduction of Xbox 360, the first next generation sys-
tem.20  Summary statistics for the data are in Table 3. 
Monthly hardware prices (average of weekly prices) are from the websites of ma-
jor retail chains.21  The game title data for software is also from the NPD Fun Group, and 
includes all games published for the three consoles.  For each title, the data include the 
publisher, date of issue, and monthly revenue by console.  When constructing the soft-
                                                 
16 See Prieger and Hu (2006) for a discussion of why autocorrelation may arise in this model.  We use the 
two-step efficient GMM estimator, where the covariance matrix used for second-step estimation and calcu-
lation of standard errors is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The Newey-West kernel (with 
bandwidth set to two lags) is used to correct for autocorrelation.   
17 See Lee (2007) for a preliminary attempt at dynamic empirical modeling of the video game market. 
18 Television ownership data are from the US Census Bureau’s 2004-2005 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (data for 2002). 
19 The NPD console sales data were acquired from gaming news site PCvsConsole.com. 
20 Microsoft announced Xbox 360 in May 2005 and launched it in November 2005.  Since we do not model 
forward-looking behavior in our model, we end our sample period well before Xbox 360 was announced.   
21 Prices are from CompUSA, Electronics Boutique, Target, Game Stop, Fry’s Electronic, Toys “R” Us and 
KB Toy Works.  Prices are adjusted with the CPI for “all urban consumers, all items”. 
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ware variety variable Njt from these data, we allow the possibility that software is “per-
ishable” in the utility function of consumers.  Instead of adopting the measure used in 
Clements and Ohashi (2005) and other studies of total software variety, accumulated 
since the introduction of the console, we investigate whether potential consumers care 
more about recent titles.  Thus, we split software into two categories: new titles (those 
issued in the current and previous three months) and the rest of the accumulated (older) 
titles.  Splitting out older software is suggested by evidence that the life cycle of a video 
game title is often brief, with more than 50% (and sometimes as much as 80%) of sales 
typically occurring during the first three months after its release (Coughlan, 2001, 
2004).22     
In the rest of this section, we address the potential endogeneity of several of the 
variables appearing on the right side of the estimating equation for hardware adoption 
and discuss our solutions.  The explanatory variables we suspect may be correlated with 
the error term in (1) are within group share, console price, and software variety.  The en-
dogeneity of within group market share,sjt|g , arises by definition: it contains the depend-
ent variable, sjt.  Console price pjt is most likely positively correlated with the unobserved 
attributes jt because an improvement in brand image will increase consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for consoles, which affects prices in the market.  Finally, the endogeneity of 
game variety arises from the indirect network effects: positive shocks to hardware de-
mand increase both the installed base and software provision.   
To control for endogeneity of console price, we use the retail console price in Ja-
pan.23  Prices in Japan are correlated with US prices because both depend on production 
costs (all consoles are manufactured at the same location).  However, Japanese prices will 
                                                 
22 In our sample, an average of 59% of total revenue is gained by the end of the first three full calendar 
months after issue of a title.  Almost one-fifth of titles gain more than 75% of their total revenue during the 
same period.  These calculations include only titles out for at least a year. 
23 Japanese console prices are from Nikkei News; sales figures are from industry-research firm Media Create. 
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not be correlated with unobserved console characteristics jt in the US hardware equation 
if Japanese gamers have different tastes for games and systems.  The pattern of console 
sales in the Japanese market shows evidence for differing tastes.  For example, unlike its 
strong performance in the US market, the sales of Xbox lag in the Japanese market, even 
with a similar price and game variety comparison to GameCube as in the US market.  
Johns (2006) attributes the widely differing market shares in US and Japan to cultural bi-
ases and specificity, and argues that the Japanese video game market is isolated from the 
US market.24   We also instrument for prices with the Japanese-US exchange rate.  Since 
some of the consoles were manufactured in Japan, fluctuations in the exchange rate 
should affect retail prices in the US (correlation between the exchange rate and US retail 
prices is 0.70).25   
To control for endogeneity of the within group market share, we use the revenue-
weighted average age of software available for a console.  An older average age of titles 
signals the presence of popular, long-lived games for a platform, which increase market 
share among consoles (Clements and Ohashi, 2005).  Given the indirect network effects, 
more software would have been available in the past when the installed base of consoles 
was greater, and so the average age of software variable is also a relevant instrument more 
generally if past console sales affect present console demand.  Software variety is instru-
mented with the accumulated game variety in Japan.26  Japanese game variety is correlated 
with US game variety (Pearson’s r = 0.90), because (differences in tastes notwithstanding) 
                                                 
24 Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the trade press holds that Japanese players tend to prefer more rela-
tional games, titles based around “cute” characters, continuing story lines, and fantasy-based games, 
whereas US players tend to prefer more realistic, action-oriented, violent games with exciting graphics and 
do not demand continuity in the story line between game editions.  See, for example, the article “Xbox 
Courts Japan” at JapanInc.com (http://www.japaninc.com/article.php?articleID=10).  Johns (2006) also 
quotes a game publisher on the differences between Japanese and western markets:  “There are huge cul-
tural differences so there isn’t really any reason why games should have anything in common”. 
25  We use the current exchange rate instead of the lagged rate used by Clements and Ohashi (2005) be-
cause the relevant Yen cost at the time of sale from a Japanese wholesaler or factory to a US retailer is the 
opportunity (replacement) cost of the console, not the embedded, sunk production cost.  
26 The data are from Famitsu, a weekly magazine covering the Japanese video game market. 
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many game titles from Japan are provided in both countries due to scale economies, given 
that much of the cost to produce a title is up front for development.  However, Japanese 
game variety is not correlated with jt if demand shocks in Japan are uncorrelated with de-
mand shocks in the US.27  In addition to the instruments above, we follow Clements and 
Ohashi (2005) and use console age (the number of months since sales began) and a full set 
of squares and interactions among all instruments. 
6. Basic Empirical Results 
We now present the results from the GMM estimation for console demand (Table 
4).  In this section, we confirm the presence of indirect network effects from software, 
and show that older titles play little role in console demand.  In the next section, we fur-
ther break new software down into exclusive and non-exclusive titles to address directly 
the role that exclusive contracts might play.   
To allow the network effects from older games to differ, while retaining the pos-
sibility that only the sum of all games (older and recent) matters, we replace ln(Njt) in 
the estimating equation (2) with the transformation  f(NRjt,NOjt;,), where f is defined 
by 
 f(w1,w2;,) = ln(w1) + ln(1 + w2/w1) (2) 
and NR and NO are the stocks of recent and older titles, respectively.  In this specification, 
there are no network effects from older titles when  = 0, and only the sum of all games 
                                                 
27 If console demand shocks in the US stimulate software titles for the US market, which in turn (due to 
scale economies) are also introduced in Japan, then Japanese game variety may not be an exogenous in-
strument.  Thus, we pay careful attention to the statistical exogeneity tests in our regressions, which reveal 
no cause for concern on this point.  There is an important asymmetry in the international video game mar-
ket that bolsters the case for using Japanese game variety to instrument for US variety:  Japanese games do 
well in the US, but US games typically fare poorly (if introduced at all) in Japan.  Thus,  “the number of 
American games that are published at all in the Japanese console market is minor” while for Japanese 
games, “the games are often developed to be sold both in and outside Japan” (Kiri, 2003). See also Glicker 
(2006), who notes that in 2005, there was only one US-made title on the top-100 seller list in Japan.    
13 
N = NO + NR matters when = .  Rejecting that =  therefore shows that not only 
the number but the age of game titles influences console demand. 
We begin by examining the relevancy and explanatory power of the instruments 
in Estimation 1, the nested logit model estimated by GMM.  In Table 4, we present a 
Wald statistic to test the relevancy of the instruments.28  The Wald test strongly rejects 
underidentification, suggesting that the instruments are relevant.  We also calculate 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 from the first stage regressions for each endogenous variable.  
The partial R2 is a measure of the explanatory power of the instruments, accounting for 
correlation among the endogenous variables and among the instruments, and helps to as-
sess whether our instruments are weak.  Even the lowest of the partial R2 statistics for the 
endogenous variables, that for the within group share (0.44), does not indicate cause for 
concern due to weak instruments.29  Since we have more instruments than instrumented 
variables, we can also make use of an overidentification test (Hansen’s J statistic) to as-
sess the validity of the instruments.30  The J statistic does not reject that the instruments 
are valid.   
The coefficients for price, recent software variety, and within group market share 
are all individually significant.  The coefficient for the transformation of older software, 
, is not significant, implying that there is no indirect network effect coming from older 
game titles.  The Anderson-Rubin F statistic, which is robust to weak instruments, shows 
                                                 
28 The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic is a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced 
form coefficients is underidentified (i.e., is rank-deficient).  The rk statistic is robust to non-i.i.d. errors, and 
generalizes the Cragg and Donald (1993) test for underidentification with multiple endogenous variables.  
Rejection of the null is evidence that the instruments are relevant and that the model is identified.  
29 There is no simple threshold for partial R2 when assessing instrument strength.  However, in all of the 
cases in Shea (1997) where the finite-sample distribution of 2SLS diverges from the asymptotic distribution, 
as measured by the empirical size (to two decimal places) of the t-test for the coefficient on the endogenous 
variable in the second stage equation, the partial R2 was much lower than 0.44. 
30 The J statistic for the Hansen-Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions imposed by the GMM esti-
mator.  The null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  A rejection of the null hypothesis of the test casts 
doubt on the validity of the instruments.  Our test statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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that the coefficients for price, software variety, and within group market share are jointly 
significant.   
The estimated impact of price is negative, so that the estimated demand curve for 
consoles is downward sloping in hardware prices.  The average price elasticity of console 
demand (also reported in Table 4) is -2.2, in the elastic region of demand, as the theory of 
pricing with market power suggests should be the case.31  Equality of coefficients  and 
 for games is rejected at better than the 1% level, which rejects the hypothesis that re-
cent and older titles are interchangeable in the demand function.  Demand is increasing in 
recent software variety, as expected from the indirect network effects, with an elasticity 
of 0.95.32  The estimated elasticity from changes in older software is insignificant, as we 
expected.33   We get the same outcome if we let both NR and NO enter the specification in 
simple log form (results not shown):  only recent software matters.  We provide a more 
detailed discussion of the elasticities below. 
In Estimation 2, we estimate the model via OLS, treating the regressors as exoge-
nous.34  This allows us to see how much the endogeneity affects the estimates.  The same 
signs are present for all coefficients, although software variety is not as significant and 
none of the implied elasticities are significant.  Thus, the instruments are able to identify 
a role for software variety in Estimation 1 that endogeneity obscures in Estimation 2.  
The OLS estimation also allows us to look for evidence of weak instruments, which can 
show up as standard errors that are much larger in Estimation 1 than those from Estima-
                                                 
31 The own-price elasticity of demand share sjt with respect to price pjt is p (1 sjt|g  (1   )sjt).  All 
elasticities are calculated as average elasticities in the sample. 
32 The elasticity of share sjt with respect to recent software variety NRjt is 12rjt(1 sjt|g(1 )sjt)/(1 ), 
following the notation of (2), where rjt is the ratio of software titles that are older. 
33  The elasticity of share sjt with respect to older software variety NOjt is 2(1 sjt|g(1 )sjt)/[Njt(1 )], 
following the notation of (2). 
34 Our OLS estimations use the same formula for  robust standard errors as the GMM estimations. 
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tion 2 are.  The comparison of standard errors reveals no suggestion of weak instru-
ments.35 
We tried other division points between older and newer titles, splitting at six and 
nine months as a robustness check.  In each case, the coefficients display the same pattern 
of statistical significance, and the share elasticity from changes in older software is negli-
gible and insignificant.  The price and recent software elasticities vary among the estima-
tions, but the ratio of software elasticity to price elasticity is about the same as in Estima-
tion 1.36  For further robustness checking, in an earlier version of the paper we estimated 
a set of models in which we relaxed the assumption that households buy only one console 
each.  The results are robust to the size of outside alternative market share.37  
7. Is There an Applications Barrier to Entry? 
Can a console maker’s exclusive contracts with video game creators create an ap-
plications barrier to entry in the console market?  Barriers to entry based on software ap-
plications for a system received much discussion in the Microsoft antitrust case (Gilbert 
and Katz, 2001).  The government contended in the case that due to the high development 
costs of making software applications, programmers would not create applications for an 
operating system unless there were already a large installed base of users.  In addition to 
the “natural” barriers to entry stemming from the network effects inherent in the market, 
the government also attacked Microsoft’s contracts with upstream suppliers, which in-
cluded inducements to exclude competing browsers.  In contracts with Internet content 
                                                 
35 The one diagnostic for weak instruments we tried that gave opposite results from the partial R2’s, the rk 
Wald statistic, and comparison of standard errors is an LM form of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) statistic.  
The weight of the evidence remains against weak instruments, and, regardless, the F statistic in Table 4 
showing the significance of the endogenous variables is robust to weak instruments. 
36 The ratio shows the relative effectiveness of pricing and software provision strategies: it measures the 
percentage reduction in console price that has equivalent effect on demand as a one-percent increase in 
software variety.  In Estimation 1, this ratio is 0.4.  With an assumed six month life for software, the ratio is 
also 0.4.  With a nine month life, the ratio is 0.3. 
37 The price and software variety coefficients were almost completely insensitive to whether the installed 
console base depreciates at an annual rate of 0%, 10%, 20%, or (as an extreme) 100%. 
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providers, Microsoft traded placement on the Windows desktop in exchange for web sites 
optimized for Internet Explorer.38  In agreements with third-party software developers, 
Microsoft traded preferential support and seals of approval in exchange for making web-
enabled applications reliant on Internet Explorer.  In theory, both of these attempts at ver-
tical restraint through exclusivity could have further heightened the applications barrier to 
entry. 
In the video game industry, if a console has few games created for it, it will die 
quickly in the market place, as happened in the sixth generation with Sega’s Dreamcast 
and in previous generations with the NEC TurboGrafx-16, the SNK Neo Geo, and the 
Atari Jaguar.  The question of antitrust concern is then whether creating games  exclu-
sively for one system, a form of “complementary market monopolization” (Brennan, 
2007), locks in enough demand to hinder entry by competitive systems or hasten exit of 
existing systems.  For this strategy to be most successful, indirect network effects must be 
present:  the availability of software must increase hardware demand, which we have 
shown to be the case in the previous section.  We now investigate whether platform pro-
viders can exploit the network effects through the creation of exclusive games. 
We begin by taking a closer look at the results of the demand estimation, focusing 
on the firms’ ability to increase demand by encouraging the growth of software variety.  
We show the elasticity of console demand share with respect to software variety implied 
by Estimation 1, broken out by console and year, in Table 5.  The software variety elas-
ticities are in the range 0.7-1.1.  The elasticities for PlayStation2 and GameCube rise 
slightly over the years, and so does the average for all consoles.  Since the hardware 
could not be improved during the generation, perhaps the rising software elasticity re-
flects that games became increasingly valuable in spurring sales of consoles as develop-
                                                 
38 The contracts required the content developers to use Microsoft technology such as dynamic HTML and 
ActiveX or other differentiated content that would not be available (or available at a lower quality) with 
competing browsers  (U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98–1232 (TPJ), Court’s Findings of 
Facts, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, November 5, 1999, at 322).   
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ers created games that were ever more desirable.  This suggests a role for console makers 
to use exclusive games to attract buyers to their own platforms, and potentially to harm 
rivals’ chances of survival in the market (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong and 
Wright, 2007).  However, the inference assumes that the demand-stimulating effects of 
software variety are the same for exclusive and non-exclusive game titles.    
Exclusionary behavior through game provision will be more successful if the indi-
rect network effects are strong for games available only on one console.  Sony, in particu-
lar, has actively sought exclusivity, with over half of PlayStation2’s games unavailable 
elsewhere (Table 2).  To see how the impacts on console share differ from games exclu-
sively available for a single system and games available for multiple systems, we re-
estimate the hardware demand equation splitting recent software titles into exclusive and 
non-exclusive games (Estimation 3 in Table 6).  We let exclusive and non-exclusive re-
cent titles enter the estimating equation through transformation f(NRNjt,NREjt;,), as de-
fined in (2), similar to how we separated recent from old software in Estimations 1 and 2, 
where NRN is the count of non-exclusive recent titles and NRE  is exclusive recent titles.   
Estimation 3 shows that exclusive software titles contribute virtually nothing to 
the indirect network effects from games in console demand.  Equality of coefficients  
and  is rejected at better than the 1% level, which rejects the hypothesis that exclusive 
and non-exclusive titles are interchangeable in buyers’ utility functions.  The coefficient 
is not significant and the elasticity of console demand with respect to recent, exclusive 
titles is close to zero.  Only non-exclusive recent games are significantly and positively 
associated with console share.39  This may limit a console maker’s options to “starve” its 
competitors by putting many exclusive games on the market, because such games appear 
not to materially increase the installed base of the maker’s own console.  In this estima-
                                                 
39 If we let both NRN and NRU enter the specification in simple log form, we get the same result: only recent 
non-exclusive software matters. 
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tion, the coefficients and elasticities for price and within group share are again significant, 
and older game titles again have no significant effect on demand.  The various diagnostic 
statistics and comparison of standard errors to the corresponding OLS estimation (Esti-
mation 4 in Table 6) look about as strong as in Estimation 1.  
Our finding that demand is virtually insensitive to the availability of exclusive 
games appears to contradict some of the conventional wisdom about the home video 
game market, and bears further investigation.  For example, undoubtedly some consum-
ers buy an Xbox mainly to play Halo, a PlayStation2 to play Grand Theft Auto: San An-
dreas, or a GameCube to play Super Smash Bros. Melee, to mention each system’s most 
popular exclusive title.  However, note that by relying on variation in software provided 
over time and across consoles, our elasticity estimate effectively measures the impact of 
the marginal title.  The few blockbuster games in existence are inframarginal titles, the 
revenue outliers from the high-variance, skewed distribution of returns to software crea-
tion.40  Our low elasticity estimate shows that a firm should not expect further exclusivity, 
beyond that seen in the data, to increase console demand. We explore why exclusive 
games have such a small impact on demand in the concluding section. 
Although the marginal exclusive title cannot heighten entry barriers, some of the 
inframarginal exclusive titles may actually help overcome (rather than erect) entry barri-
ers.  Koski and Kretchmer (2004) point out that game provision need not lead to insuper-
able entry barriers when there is a critical mass or threshold in the indirect network ef-
fects, beyond which additional games increase consumer utility little.  The sales distribu-
tion of game titles is highly skewed:  each system has a few blockbuster games that earn 
the bulk of the revenue.  As long as a critical mass of superstar games is available for a 
console, it will overcome any entry barriers and survive in the market.  In Table 7, we 
show the 13 games that earned $125 million or more during our sample period (the aver-
                                                 
40 The skewness of per-title software revenue in our data is 7.1. 
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age revenue for all the other titles in the data is only about $10 million).  The table shows 
that despite the huge revenue the Grand Theft Auto games (which were initially exclusive 
titles) earned for PlayStation2, Microsoft was able to carve out enough market share for 
Xbox to be viable by providing its exclusive Halo titles.  It is also interesting to note that 
over half the titles among the top 13 are non-exclusive, and therefore do not lock players 
into any single platform. 
To address the inframarginal impact of software exclusivity on console demand 
suggested by these data, in Estimation 5 we add a regressor Ajt for the fraction of game 
titles in the market that can be played on the console.41  Revenue from the current and 
three previous months are used to weight the fraction.  Ajt measures how much of the 
complementary good market is available to the owner of a particular console.  Variables 
NRNjt and NREjt are left in the specification, to control for the indirect network effects 
stemming immediately from the number of titles available.  Exclusivity by the other con-
sole makers lowers Ajt.  Thus, the coefficient on Ajt is the impact on a console’s demand 
(additional to the traditional indirect network effects) of decreasing the exclusivity of 
software offered for rival consoles. 
There is a great deal of variation in the software availability fraction: Ajt ranges 
from 36% to 83%, and does not follow a simple time trend.  To differentiate the marginal 
and inframarginal impacts of exclusivity, Ajt enters the specification in a linear spline 
with a knot at 75%.42  The results from Estimation 5 (Table 6) are similar to that of Esti-
mation 3 for the other regressors—in particular, exclusive titles still have no significant 
effect on demand—and we do not discuss them further. 
                                                 
41 The splined variable is treated as endogenous.  We do not add additional instruments, because the various 
diagnostic statistics (in particular the Shea R2) do not suggest the need.  Nevertheless, we also estimated the 
model adding an analogously constructed (with the exception that we do not weight by revenue) variable 
from the Japanese market; results were close to that of Estimation 5. 
42 Placing the knot anywhere above the median of 70% yields the same qualitative results and significance.   
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The software availability fraction, when below 75%, has no significant impact on 
console demand.  This finding reflects our result from Estimation 3 that marginal in-
creases in exclusivity do not affect console demand.  More interesting is that when Ajt is  
above 75%, software availability has a large and significant impact on demand.  The es-
timates imply that a decrease in game availability of 10 percentage points (say from 
100% to 90%, or 85% to 75%) due to exclusivity lowers average console demand share 
by about 38%.43  Thus, exclusivity can help a firm take a lot of demand from rival con-
soles at first, but eventually additional locking up of software supply no longer stimulates 
console demand.    
8. Characterizing Exclusivity in Contracting 
Why is the impact of the marginal exclusive game title so minimal, when it ap-
pears that a little exclusivity can take much market share from rivals?  An examination of 
the characteristics of exclusive and non-exclusive titles in Table 8 hints at the answer.  In 
our discussion, we focus on the two market leaders, although statistics for GameCube are 
also in Table 8.  Despite the presence of blockbuster exclusive games among the top 
earners (Table 7), both PlayStation2 and Xbox garner most of their revenue from non-
exclusive titles.  For PlayStation2, this is true even though there are more exclusive 
games than non-exclusive games.44  Looking at average and median sales per title makes 
it clear that not all games are created equal:  non-exclusive games are more profitable on 
average.  A battery of hypothesis tests, also reported in Table 7, generally confirms that 
the mean and median revenue per title is higher for non-exclusive games.  Furthermore, 
for PlayStation2 non-exclusive games earn their revenue quicker than do exclusive games, 
                                                 
43 Market shares for a firm are calculated assuming only the offerings of the other firms changed, and are 
averaged over the sample. 
44 It is also true even if the Grand Theft Auto games, which were available for Playstation2 long before they 
were available for Xbox, are classified as exclusive.  None of the discussion about mean and median reve-
nue per title in this section would change upon reclassification. 
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as measured by the percentage of total revenue earned in the first four months of release, 
so that non-exclusive titles look even more attractive in present-value terms. 
Compared to third-party exclusive games created by independent publishers,  ex-
clusive, self-provided games garner more revenue on average.  The hierarchy, then, is 
that third-party non-exclusive games earn the most money on average, followed by self-
provided games and then third-party exclusive games.  The implication: in general (but 
with notable exceptions provided by inframarginal games) only the lowest quality, least 
desirable games are available for exclusive contracting with third party publishers.  Why? 
The game development and publishing industry has changed greatly from the 
third-generation days of Nintendo’s exclusive contracts with suppliers, in which a devel-
oper’s entire line of games was locked into a single console.  One industry marketing re-
port points out that the spiraling cost of video game creation requires unit sales levels so 
large that only one in twenty titles breaks even.45  Thus, software publishers simply can-
not afford to lock themselves into a single platform, and publishers with enough market 
power of their own resist signing exclusive contracts.  
It appears that there are game publishers with enough market clout to bring sub-
stantial bargaining power to the table in negotiations with console makers.  In Table 9, 
we show the characteristics of software produced by the top seven publishers, including 
console makers Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo.  A full quarter of industry software reve-
nue in our data is garnered by Electronic Arts (EA).  EA also accounts for over half the 
games on the list of top selling titles in Table 7.  One reason is that EA’s games are of 
high average quality.46  Their average quality score (shown in Table 9) is almost 25% 
higher than the average of publishers outside the top seven.  EA’s games also earn more 
                                                 
45 DFC Intelligence, The Business of Computer and Video Games, op. cit.  Production of modern video 
games rivals Hollywood in the size and scope of the endeavor.  Creating a game requires teams of game 
designers, programmers, graphic artists, audio technicians, and producers. 
46 The quality scores are from gamerankings.com, and are averages of online reviews from dozens of inde-
pendent sources online. 
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revenue per title (nearly $17 million) than any other independent publisher in the top 
group, and over three times the average of other publishers.  Part of EA’s success in re-
cent years is due to its leveraging of its market power to secure exclusive contracts of its 
own in the content market.  For example, in 2004 the NFL granted EA a five-year exclu-
sive right to its teams and players for use in video games.  EA’s desirable products give 
them the bargaining power to refuse exclusive contracts with console makers.  Eighty-
seven percent of their titles are available on at least two platforms, the highest percentage 
of any in the top group and much higher than the mass of other publishers.  The other 
large independent publishers, Take 2, Activision, and THQ, also have a high fraction of 
their titles (77 to 81%) available for multiple platforms. 
Implicit in models of exclusive contracting in platform markets is the assumption 
that the product attributes of the complementary good are the same whether vertical re-
straints are imposed (Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003).  We have 
shown empirically that the ability of the leading complementary good suppliers to resist 
exclusivity can greatly alter the market outcome from the models’ predictions of foreclo-
sure and entry deterrence. 
9. Conclusion 
We find that allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not 
lead to a market structure dominated by one system protected by a hedge of complemen-
tary software.  We thus extend the growing empirical literature that finds that anticom-
petitive outcomes need not follow from vertical restraints (Snyder, 1995; Cooper et al., 
2005).  Indirect network effects are present and strong in the home video game market—
a fact that, by itself, suggests exclusive contracts may lead to foreclosure of the incum-
bent’s rivals.  Indeed, starting from a point of little exclusive contracting, controlling 
more of the software market garners market share from rivals, up to a point.  In some in-
23 
dustries, it may be that what looks like a small amount of exclusivity by our measure 
would be enough to foreclose competitors from all the important sources of supply of the 
complementary good.  However, two important features of the video game market pre-
vent a monopolized market outcome or evidence of consumer harm, even in the presence 
of vertical restraints.  When software exclusive to one platform is of lower quality or oth-
erwise of less interest to buyers than software available for multiple platforms, a platform 
provider has limited power to take additional market share by monopolizing the comple-
mentary good market.  Furthermore, when the distribution of software sales is highly 
skewed, then an entrant platform can thrive as long as it produces a few exclusive block-
buster titles and take some market share from its rivals.  These features are lacking in 
much of the theoretical work on two-sided markets to date, to our knowledge.47  
There is no evidence, therefore, that allowing additional exclusive vertical con-
tracting would harm competition or welfare in the video game market.  In fact, by allevi-
ating the typical problems associated with free riding by rivals on inspecific investment, 
exclusivity in supply probably enlarged consumers’ choice of consoles.  Microsoft spent 
an industry-record $500 million in 18 months for the marketing of Xbox, attempting to 
catch up to PlayStation2 (Schilling, 2003).  If Microsoft could not advertise its popular 
exclusive, third party titles such as Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic and Dead or 
Alive 3 (not to mention its self-provided blockbusters such as Halo) without providing a 
positive externality for its rivals, it is unlikely it would have brought Xbox to market. 
This suggests that exclusivity in contracting may improve the efficiency of the market we 
examine. 
An interesting extension of the current work would be to examine the game pub-
lishers’ side of the market for anticompetitive effects from exclusivity in contracting.  As 
                                                 
47 Two promising, recent exceptions are provided by Mantena, et al. (2007), who allow a single strategic 
publisher to have an exogenous quality advantage over its non-strategic rivals, and Hogendorn and Yuen 
(2007), who explicitly add blockbuster complementary goods to their model. 
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we discussed in the previous section, publisher EA uses upstream vertical contracts to 
exclude content providers such as the NFL from licensing content to other software de-
velopers.  Oster’s (1995) work shows (in spirit, at least—her model is designed with a 
different market in mind) that exclusive licensing may lessen competition from other de-
velopers.  While we argue here that the market power of publishers such as EA lessens 
the fear of a console maker using exclusive contracts to gain market dominance, consum-
ers’ welfare also depends on game variety.  This suggests that there may be an optimal 
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Table 1:  Platform Characteristics 
 
Platform Introduced Manufacturer 
Hardware  
Characteristics 
 GPU CPU RAM
(MHz) (MHz) (GB)
Statistic 2002 2003 2004 
% Console Sold 0.61 0.50 0.42 
Mean Console Price 233 187 160 Play-Station2 
October 
2000 Sony 150 300 32 
% Software variety 0.44 0.43 0.47 
% Console Sold 0.23 0.25 0.37 
Mean Console Price 237 187 157 Xbox October 2001 Microsoft 233 733 64 
% Software variety 0.30 0.33 0.34 
% Console Sold 0.17 0.26 0.21 
Mean Console Price 171 133 100 GameCube October 2001 Nintendo 162 485 24 
% Software variety 0.26 0.24 0.19 
      Total Console Sales (Million Units) 14.1 12.9 10.9 
      Total Software  Variety 502 539 511 
 




Table 2: Software Provision 
 







Stock at end 
of 2004 
 Game Titles 202 250 249 257 958 
PlayStation2 % exclusive to the platform 80 50 48 49 55 
 % provided by manufacturer 11 8.8 10 7.8 9.3 
 Game Titles 34 162 201 184 581 
Xbox % exclusive to the platform 50 31 33 34 34 
 % provided by manufacturer 21 8.6 10.5 7.1 9.5 
 Game Titles 18 149 138 103 408 
GameCube % exclusive to the platform 39 27 31 29 29 























Mean 0.74 0.52 175 83 501 41 43 
Max 3.37 0.64 289 148 812 72 82 
Min 0.22 0.32 135 41 187 20 19 PlayStation2 
s.d. 0.69 0.09 35 32 202 13 21 
Mean 0.42 0.28 176 60 240 22 38 
Max 1.83 0.51 289 113 475 38 77 
Min 0.08 0.19 135 25 25 9 16 Xbox 
s.d. 0.42 0.08 37 26 150 8 19 
Mean 0.32 0.20 123 44 184 16 28 
Max 1.71 0.36 193 100 349 32 68 
Min 0.09 0.12 90 18 13 7 11 GameCube 
s.d. 0.38 0.05 33 21 116 6 17 
Mean 0.49 0.33 158 62 309 26 36 
Max 3.37 0.64 289 148 812 72 82 
Min 0.08 0.12 90 18 13 7 11 Overall 
s.d. 0.54 0.16 43 31 211 14 20 
 




Table 4:  Nested Logit Demand Estimations for Sixth Generation Game Consoles 
 
 Estimation 1 (GMM) Estimation 2 (OLS) 
 Coefficient s.e Partial R2 Coefficient s.e 
Constant -0.306 1.637 -- -1.157 1.884 
Price (log) -1.070** 0.220 0.672 -0.869** 0.258 
Game Titles  
(recent, log) 0.317** 0.108 0.847 0.239* 0.121 
Game Titles  
(1 + old/recent, log)  -0.189 0.126 0.795 -0.060 0.140 
Within Group Share 0.614** 0.152 0.444 0.836** 0.134 
    
R2 0.928 0.936 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic p-value = 0.0000 -- 
Hansen J statistic  p-value = 0.7350 -- 
Anderson-Rubin F statistic p-value = 0.0000 -- 
Elasticities   
Price   -2.198** -3.810 
Game Titles (recent)  0.947** 1.250 
Game Titles (old)  -0.296   -0.202 
 
* = significant at 5% level.  ** = significant at 1% level. 
Notes:    N = 102.  For dependent variable, see equation (1).  Data are by month and console.  All specifications include console and year effects (and their inter-
actions), and seasonal effects.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Game Titles (recent) is the software variety accumulated dur-
ing the current month and the three previous months.  Partial R2 (Shea, 1997) is a measure of the explanatory power of the instruments, accounting for correlation 
among the endogenous variables and among the instruments.  Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic tests for underidentification.  Hansen J statistic tests the overi-
dentifying restrictions, for instrument exogeneity.  Anderson-Rubin F statistic tests for the joint significance of the endogenous variables.  See text for details. 
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Table 5: Elasticity of Demand Share with Respect to Software Variety 
 
Platform 2002 2003 2004 Average 
0.749** 0.834** 0.912** 0.837** PlayStation2 
(0.184) (0.214) (0.253) (0.219) 
0.941** 1.017** 0.960** 0.974** Xbox (0.353) (0.340) (0.286) (0.323) 
0.938** 1.033** 1.106** 1.031** GameCube (0.372) (0.348) (0.367) (0.359) 
0.876** 0.961** 0.993** 0.947** Average (0.302) (0.300) (0.302) (0.300) 
 
** = significant at 1% level. 
Notes: Game variety elasticity is for recent games only.  Elasticities and asymptotic standard errors calculated based on Estimation 1.  Standard errors (in paren-




Table 6:  Nested Logit Demand Estimation for Game Consoles:  Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Software 
 
 
Estimation 3 (GMM) Estimation 4 (OLS) Estimation 5 (GMM) 
 Coefficient s.e Partial R2 Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e Partial R2 
Constant -2.469 1.365 --   -1.505 1.903 -0.439 2.155 -- 
Price (log) -0.610** 0 .219 0.598 -0.796* 0.281 -0.805** 0.295 0.551 
Recent Game Titles  
(non-exclusive, log) 0.327** 0.042 0.678 0.270**    0.040 0.348** 0.045 0.669 
Recent Game Titles  
(1 + exclusive/non-exclusive, log) 0.010 0.120 0.583 0.179    0.145 0.150 0.174 0.542 
Older Game Titles -0.047 0.071 0.762 -0.034    0.101 -0.089 0.127 0.679 
Recent Game Titles available to con-
sole (fraction, < 0.75)      -0.267  0.618 0.658 
Recent Game Titles available to con-
sole (fraction, > 0.75)      4.815**  1.789 0.680 
Within Group Share 0.779** 0.115 0.513 0.840** 0.134 0.717** 0.138 0.487 
         
R2 0.938 0.937  0.938 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic p-value = 0.0000 -- p-value = 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic  p-value = 0.8156 -- p-value = 0.5805 
Anderson-Rubin F stat. p-value = 0.0000 -- p-value = 0.0000 
    
Elasticities    
Price  -2.027* -3.585 -2.147** 
Game Titles (recent, non-exclusive) 1.073* 0.905 0.772** 
Game Title (recent, exclusive) 0.013 0.309 0.009 
Game Titles (old)  -0.156 -0.153 -0.229 
 
* = significant at 5% level.  ** = significant at 1% level. 
Notes:    See notes to Table 4.  Recent Game Titles available to console is the fraction of all titles available (weighted by game revenue) for any console in the 
current and three previous months that are available for console j; it is splined with a knot at 0.75 (the coefficients are the slope in the relevant region).  Standard 





Table 7:  Top Software Titles 
 
Revenue 
Rank Game Title Publisher Platforms 
Revenue 
($Millions) 
1 Grand Theft Auto:Vice* Rockstar Games† PS2 & Xbox‡ 334.9 
2 Grand Theft Auto 3* Rockstar Games† PS2 & Xbox§ 319.9 
3 Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas Rockstar Games† PS2 276.5 
4 Halo 2 and Halo 2 Limited Ed. Microsoft Xbox 234.2 
5 Madden NFL 2004 Electronic Arts All consoles 221.4 
6 Madden NFL 2005 Electronic Arts All consoles 207.0 
7 Madden NFL 2003 Electronic Arts All consoles 165.6 
8 Halo Microsoft Xbox 161.1 
9 Need for Speed: Underground Electronic Arts All consoles 159.8 
10 Need for Speed: Underground 2 Electronic Arts All consoles 142.4 
11 Madden NFL 2002 Electronic Arts All consoles 132.2 
12 Medal of Honor: Frontline Electronic Arts All consoles¶ 129.1 
13 Spider-Man: The Movie Activision All consoles 124.9 
 
Notes: 
 * Revenue includes half of revenue from sales of the Grand Theft Auto dual pack (Vice and 3). 
 † Rockstar Games is a division (developer) of Take 2 Interactive. 
 ‡ Released for Xbox one year after available for PlayStation2. 
 § Released for Xbox two years after available for PlayStation2. 
 ¶ Released for Xbox and GameCube 6 months after available for PlayStation2 
Table 8:  Software Characteristics by Console 





















Exclusive   
ANOVA 






PlayStation2 457 95 466       
Total Revenue ($M) 6,174.1 1,159.3 2,888.5       
 mean ($M) 15.5 12.2 6.1  0.000 0.010  0.000 0.000 
 median ($M) 4.8 4.3 2.2  0.000 0.003  0.000 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 62.5% 56.0% 57.0%  0.000 0.641  0.108 0.000 
 median 70.5% 62.7% 64.1%  0.000 0.820  0.000 0.001 
Xbox 416 54 155       
Total Revenue ($M) 2,344.3 802.8 599.8       
 mean ($M) 5.8 12.0 4.3  0.634 0.056  0.000 0.034 
 median ($M) 2.5 5.6 1.6  0.973 0.006  0.022 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 62.4% 61.9% 60.7%  0.423 0.683  0.101 0.697 
 median 70.8% 67.7% 72.0%  0.973 0.358  0.973 0.848 
GameCube 305 37 91       
Total Revenue ($M) 1,152.4 974.2 392.7       
 mean ($M) 4.0 32.5 4.4  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 median ($M) 1.9 17.7 1.3  0.718 0.000  0.000 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 54.0% 65.4% 52.5%  0.405 0.000  0.048 0.000 
 median 61.4% 75.5% 57.0%  0.718 0.009  0.718 0.013 
 
Notes: 
Revenue calculated from data covering Oct. 2000 to Mach. 2005 for game titles on the market for at least 
12 months.  Two-sample mean tests are two-sided t tests for equal means among the categories, and do not 
assume equal variances.  Median tests are two-side Pearson chi-squared tests for equal medians among the 
categories.  Three-sample mean tests are from ANOVA F-statistics, and assume equal variances.  The re-
gression-based F tests for the mean are robust tests that the regression coefficients on categorical dummy 
variables are zero from a regression of the row variable on categorical dummy variables.  The regression-
based F tests for the median are similar to those for the mean, but are based on a quantile regression for the 
median (least absolute deviations). 
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Electronic Arts 258 87% 4,033.7 24.5% 16.9 4 7.9 
Take 2 110 82% 1,487.7 9.0% 13.4 5 6.7 
Sony 95 0% 1,159.3 7.0% 12.2 6 7.4 
Activision 102 81% 1,154.4 7.0% 11.2 8 7.1 
Nintendo of America 37 0% 974.2 5.9% 32.5 2 8.0 
Microsoft 55 2% 805.4 4.9% 11.8 7 7.7 
THQ 110 77% 754.1 4.6% 7.0 13 6.7 
        
Other independent publishers 1,309 53% 6,119.2 37.1% 5.2  6.4 
Notes:  Sample includes all game titles for GameCube, PlayStation2, and Xbox from Oct. 2000 to March 2005, except for revenue per title, which does not in-
clude titles available for fewer than 12 months in the data.  Data are from NPD Fun Group and gamerankings.com 
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Figure 1:  US Market Sales of Video Game Consoles 
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